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PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS: DEALING WITH THE
POSSIBLE BUT NOT CERTAIN
Stephen Daniels*
Joanne Martin**
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs' lawyers do not work in a world of predictability or one of
uncertainty. For them the dichotomy probably makes little sense.
They work in a world of the possible, one grounded in the variability
and complexities of individual disputes and the processes that resolve
them. As one lawyer we interviewed said about screening cases, he
has
to be able to see the light at the end of the tunnel. It doesn't mean
that I'm 100% sure I'm going to recover, because it is never guaran-
teed. But I usually have a pretty good idea when I take a case that
there is going to be some sort of recovery.'
To use the obvious term, plaintiffs' lawyers work in a world of contin-
gency. Between the extremes of predictability and uncertainty, they
work in a context of knowable patterns and regularities that allow
them to make judgments about the likely. Plaintiffs' lawyers as we
know them would not have a place in a truly predictable or regular-
ized legal world because there would be few, if any, disputes.2 Nor
would they exist in a truly uncertain or random legal world because
the risks in taking a case would be too great. In either situation, no
* Research Professor, American Bar Foundation.
** Research Professor Emerita, American Bar Foundation. Research supported by the
American Bar Foundation. The views expressed are those of the authors, not the American Bar
Foundation.
1. All lawyers quoted in this paper were interviewed as a part of our research on Texas plain-
tiffs' lawyers. A detailed description of our methodology for the 2000 survey can be found in
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The
Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs' Practice in Texas, 80 Tx. L. Ri'v. 1781, 1826-28 (2002). The
methodology of the 2006 survey was the same except that it used a current list of plaintiffs'
lawyers rather than the one used in 2000, and it included new questions asking about referral
practices. The 2000 survey had a response rate of 27.3% and the 2006 survey had a response rate
of 25.7%. Id. at 1827. For both surveys, the number of responses fell within a confidence inter-
val of plus or minus four percentage points at the 95% confidence level. Survey responses are
confidential and on file with the authors.
2. This, of course, would make some critics quite happy. See generally Piniue K. HOWARD,
LiiE Wrrtiou-r LAWYERS: LIBERATING AMERICANS FROM Too Mucii LAw (2009).
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one would be foolish enough to engage their services-there would be
no point. The adversary system is based on the idea that neither situa-
tion describes reality.
The contingent world in which these lawyers work includes
processes and actors that resolve disputes within well-understood
rules both formal and informal. Most of the papers in this Symposium
focus on issues related to uncertainty (or the lack of predictability) in
the formal rules and processes-the "black letter law" or the law on
the books. Our focus is different; it is on the empirical reality of the
world in which plaintiffs' lawyers work-the law in action. This dis-
tinction between the law on the books and the law in action is an old
one among law and society scholars. Stewart Macaulay described the
idea in the following way:
I need not remind practicing lawyers that law is not only rules or
appellate opinions. It is structures and practices in courts and ad-
ministrative agency hearing rooms. It is the attempts by the Gover-
nor and the legislators to cope with emerging social problems. It is
the quaint native customs of bench and bar in particular cities. It is
the lawyer seeking new ways to deal with corporate take-overs or
Superfund litigation in her office. It is also the not always consistent
collection of ideas about law held by . . . citizens.3
The distinction is especially relevant in the context of uncertainty and
predictability in the legal system because it is in the world of legal
action where this distinction matters.
Along with the long-term concern with regard to the law on the
books, there has also been concern over uncertainty with regard to the
law in action. It can be seen in the political debate over tort reform
and what can be called the "predictability critique" of the civil justice
system. A serious lack of predictability in key parts of the system in
action has been a predominant part of the argument made by tort
reform advocates for substantial changes in the civil justice system.
As if recognizing the centrality of juries and jury verdicts, much of
that critique has focused on them. The problem is an alleged lack of
predictability in what juries do and hence the characterization of the
jury system as a lottery. This, in turn, is supposedly the cause of
broader social and economic ills. 4 Plaintiffs' lawyers are a key part of
3. Stewart Macaulay, Wisconsin's Legal Tradition, 24 GARGOYLE, nO. 3, 1993, at 6, 9.
4. For instance, see the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) Web site, describing the
organization's mission and stating, "These [tort] lawsuits are bad for business; they are also bad
for society. They compromise access to affordable health care, punish consumers by raising the
cost of goods and services, chill innovation, and undermine the notion of personal responsibil-
ity." ATR's Mission: Real Justice in Our Courts, AMERICAN TORT REFORM AsSOCIATION, http:/
/www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
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the problem because, the critics argue, they help foster and maintain
the unpredictability and profit greatly by it.s
In light of the predictability critique and the uncertain world it
presumes, our interest in this Article is in how plaintiffs' lawyers per-
ceive that same world. They must be keen observers of their environ-
ment-and the rules, processes, and actors in it-if they are to have
any hope of being successful and making a profit. Given that these
lawyers exist, and do so profitably, we want to identify and describe
the sense of that environment that is reflected in how they structure
their practices and what they actually do. We want to explore what
these things tell us about the civil justice system and whether a pre-
dictability/uncertainty dichotomy is helpful in understanding it.
This Article is divided into five substantive parts. Part II looks
briefly at the idea of the predictability/uncertainty dichotomy with re-
gard to juries and does so from the perspective of the tort reform rhet-
oric, in which it is deeply embedded.6 Juries are especially important
to plaintiffs' lawyers, and juries are also a major target of tort reform-
ers. Part III looks at the logic of plaintiffs' practice, a business model
built on a particular view of how the civil justice system works-one
that will support a successful practice that relies upon matters taken
on a contingency fee basis.7 This Part emphasizes the importance of
juries, jury verdicts, and "going rates" to the logic of that business
model. Because going rates delineate the possible, they also mean
that substantial risk is involved for contingency fee-based practices.8
In light of this, Part IV looks at what makes such a risky environment
an attractive one.9 One might well ask the question of why a lawyer
would even try to build a contingency fee practice in a highly risky
environment. The predictability critique, in its view of the law in ac-
tion, points solely to profit-that plaintiffs' lawyers extract significant
5. Again looking to the ATRA Web site, we find the following statement:
Aggressive personal injury lawyers target certain professions, industries, and individual
companies as profit centers. They systematically recruit clients who may never have
suffered a real illness or injury and use scare tactics, combined with the promise of
awards, to bring these people into massive class action suits. They effectively tap the
media to rally sentiment for multi-million-dollar punitive damage awards. ...
... The personal injury lawyers who benefit from the status quo use their fees to per-
petuate the cycle of lawsuit abuse. They have reinvested millions of dollars into the
political process and in more litigation that acts as a drag on our economy.
Id.
6. See infra notes 12-34 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 35-60 and accompanying text.
8. See generally HERBERT M. KRIEI'ZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY
FEE LEGAL PRACrICE IN THE UNIfED STATEs (2004).
9. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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and unwarranted profits from the civil justice system's dysfunctions.
The view reflected in the practices of plaintiffs' lawyers is not so
simple.
Part V looks at a more practical issue: how the logic underlying the
plaintiffs' lawyers' business model shapes their practices. 0 Part VI
also looks at a practical issue: how that logic affects what plaintiffs'
lawyers do in trying to get clients." This is perhaps the major chal-
lenge faced by plaintiffs' lawyers-maintaining a steady stream of cli-
ents with injuries the legal system will compensate adequately
(meaning an amount sufficient to provide compensation for the client,
a fee for the lawyer, and reimbursement for the costs incurred by the
lawyer in representing the client). If the challenge is not met, then the
lawyer goes out of business. And some do. As one lawyer told us, "As
long as the phones are ringing, we're OK. If the phones stop ringing, I
may as well turn out the lights."
To explore these issues, we will draw from our research on Texas
plaintiffs' lawyers, which includes two rounds of in-depth interviews
and two detailed mail surveys. The first round of interviews took place
in the late 1990s and the second took place in 2005-2006 (a total of
151 interviews). Among other things, both sets of interviews asked
lawyers a series of detailed questions concerning their practices. The
first survey took place in 2000 and had 554 respondents, while the
second was in 2006 and had 460 respondents. Both surveys asked ex-
actly the same questions about lawyers' practices, and for this Article
we utilized the pooled responses from both surveys.
II. PREDICTABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Juries have long been a target of critics, largely because of a concern
over bias and competence. 12 For instance, Jerome Frank, writing in
the early 1930s, gave voice to a common and persistent view of juries.
He said, "Proclaiming that we have a government of laws, we have, in
jury cases, created a government of often ignorant and prejudiced
men."13 He saw juries as capricious and prejudiced. They ignore legal
rules and doctrines and allow non-legal and often irrelevant factors to
sway their judgment. Indeed, he claimed, "That the defendant is a
10. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
12. The discussion in this Part draws from STEPHEN DANuIJS & JOANNE MARIIN, CIVIL JU-
RIES AND I- Poirrics op RFFORM 1-28 (1995).
13. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND TIIE MODERN MIND 191 (1963).
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wealthy corporation and the plaintiff is a poor boy . . . often deter-
mine[s] who will win or lose." 14
One can find similar sentiments in insurance industry public rela-
tions campaigns from the 1950s onward to the tort reform debate that
heated up in the 1980s and continues today. By the 1970s there was
an organized and concerted effort to bring about change in the civil
justice system, and the criticism of juries played a central role in that
effort.'5 For instance, writing in 1979 about insurance industry advo-
cacy advertisements, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus observed,
In response [to jury verdicts] several insurance companies have be-
gun a curious advertising campaign ....
These firms [such as St. Paul Insurance and Aetna] have spent at
least $10 million on print advertisements in such varied publications
as Time, Newsweek, the Wall Street Journal, Sports Illustrated, Na-
tional Review, and New Republic. For example, one ad of the St.
Paul Insurance Company begins, "You really think it's the insurance
company that's paying for all those large jury awards?" and goes on
to answer that question, "We all do."I 6
The criticisms that fueled that earlier effort have dominated the de-
bate ever since-juries continue to be cast as capricious.' 7 As a result,
the critics believe the jury system has become a bizarre lottery, lacking
predictability and consistency as to who wins and how much winners
are awarded.
This allegation has had special relevance in areas like medical mal-
practice and products liability where damage awards can be very high.
For example, in a widely circulated, pro-tort reform speech from the
mid-1980s entitled The American Tort System: A Time to Rebalance
the Scales of Justice, insurance executive William McCormick com-
plained that "[c]ertainty and predictability have been two casualties of
the developments of the last 25 years. Without certainty and predict-
ability, plaintiffs sue, defendants don't know how to protect them-
selves and we in the insurance industry can't price, and in some cases
14. Id.
15. See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGIHTS: THE BATELE OVER
LIrIGATION IN AM.RICAN SociETY 22-59 (2002); DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 12, at 29-59;
WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAw: PoITIcs, MEDIA, AND Ti-
LITIGATION CRISIS 33-52 (2004); JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DEl GAD)O, No MERCY: How
CONSERVATIVE TINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA
96-108 (1996).
16. Elizabeth Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (1979). For
a discussion of similar campaigns in the mid-1980s, see generally Franklin W. Nutter, The Fight
for Civil Justice Reform, INS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 2.
17. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIAIL Y: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 50 (1988).
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can't accept, risks."' Dr. Otis Bowen, Secretary of Health and
Human Services in the Reagan Administration (this Administration
was a major player in jump-starting the tort reform effort in the mid-
1980s),19 criticized the jury in the medical malpractice system: "It has
become more a lottery than a rational system for compensating the
injured. "20
Peter Huber, a prolific tort reform policy entrepreneur, echoed
these criticisms in his widely read book, Liability: The Legal Revolu-
tion and Its Consequences. He complained of the "mounting random-
ness and incoherence of jury outcomes" in products liability cases.21
In his conclusion, he characterized the situation as "today's wide-open
legal casino." 22 Long-time critic Jeffrey O'Connell even titled a 1979
book on the civil justice system The Lawsuit Lottery to describe "the
capricious nature of our legal system as it applies to personal injury
cases." 23 Former Monsanto CEO Richard Mahoney, in a series of
widely circulated publications in the mid-1980s, also complained of
uncertainty in the products liability area, especially with regard to
cases involving punitive damages. In a co-authored piece that ap-
peared in the prestigious journal Science, Mahoney and Director of
Public Affairs for Monsanto, Stephen Littlejohn, stated that "[w]hen
coupled with strict liability, huge punitive damage awards [made by
juries] are the greatest cause of legal uncertainty for innovators." 24
They went on to say that "[t]he punitive damages system makes it too
easy for lawyers to mislead jurors" and to reference the Reagan Jus-
tice Department for the observation "that punitive damages have be-
come a legal lottery."25
Concern over juries continues today. For instance, the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform annually surveys "in-
house general counsel, senior litigators or attorneys, and other senior
executives who are knowledgeable about litigation matters at public
and private companies with annual revenues of at least $100 mil-
18. William M. McCormick, The American Tort System: A Time to Rebalance the Scales of
Justice, 52 VITAL SPEECHES oi rE DAY 267, 268 (1986).
19. See generally U.S. DFP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT Pojicy WORKING Giour ON
THE CAUSES, ExTENT AND PoLicY IMPLICATIONS OF TIE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY ANI) AFFORDAI.IrY (1986).
20. Otis R. Bowen, Congressional Testimony on Senate Bill S. 1804, 257 JAMA 816, 818
(1987).
21. Hunmz, supra note 17, at 50.
22. Id. at 229.
23. JEFFREY O'CONNEi L, TIHE LAwsuri LorrERY: ONLY THlE LAWYERS WIN 4 (1979).
24. Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages Ver-
sus New Products, 246 Sci. 1395, 1396 (1989).
25. Id. (citing U.S. Di-r'Tr OF JusTicE, supra note 19).
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lion."26 Problems with juries are the most important factors, accord-
ing to the survey respondents, in creating a bad litigation environment
and hence a low score on the Institute's ranking scale. 27 Among the
specific problems are unpredictability, bias, unfairness, excessive
awards, and incompetence. 28 As further evidence of the ongoing con-
cern over jury predictability and related allegations, one need only
look to the contribution of Valerie Hans and Theodore Eisenberg to
this Symposium-a contribution that calls the predictability critique
into question.29
As noted in Jerome Frank's earlier quote, there has always been a
certain contradictory element in the criticism of juries. This is seen in
the asserted combination of capriciousness and bias on the part of ju-
ries. Along with being a random lottery, jury decision making is also
characterized as consistently and inappropriately favoring some inter-
ests to the detriment of others. An old and widely asserted claim is
that juries are biased against businesses, professionals, governmental
bodies, and other defendants with deep pockets. One need only look
at Frank's claim about the poor boy and the wealthy corporation for
an expression of this notion. The problem, in his estimation and in
that of many more recent critics, is that juries generally decide in favor
of individual plaintiffs suing so-called deep pocket defendants and
consistently award the plaintiffs large sums of money.30
In another article published the same year as the one in Science,
Monsanto CEO Mahoney claimed that there is "a statistically proven
relationship between the punitive damages award and the relative
wealth and unpopularity of the defendant."31 He alludes to the same
idea in the Science article, although less boldly.32 He further muddies
the waters by saying that the "legal lottery" that defines the awarding
of punitive damages is apparently certain enough that plaintiffs' law-
26. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL RFFORM, RANKING THE STATES: LAwSUrr CLI-
MATE 27 (2010), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/
pdf/lawsuitclimate20l0/2010LawsuitClimateReport.pdf.
27. See id. at 13.
28. Id.
29. See generally Valerie Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60
DEPAUL L. REv. 375 (2010).
30. For a different view of this claim, see VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: TIE CIVIL
JURY AND CORPORATE RsPONSIiutrry 219-21 (2000).
31. Richard J. Mahoney, Consumers, Competitiveness Suffer from Excesses in Punitive Dam-
ages, FINANCIER, Jan. 1989, at 20, 21. While Mahoney is arguing against such a relationship, Marc
Galanter and David Luban have argued in favor of it, saying, "High punitive damages awards
hit homo economicus where it hurts: an eye for eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a bottom line for a
bottom line. It is poetic justice." Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Dam-
ages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1440 (1992).
32. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 24, at 1397.
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yers can successfully bet on a favorable outcome: "Even though their
probability of success is small and only about 5% of all cases filed end
with a verdict, plaintiffs' lawyers recognize that if enough such claims
are filed, they may eventually hit the jackpot." 33
While the notion of bias is, at one level, in apparent contradiction
with that of capriciousness, the two are similar in one respect. The
underlying logic is that juries are incompetent to decide cases fairly
and rationally. The difference between the two allegations lies in the
presumed result of jury incompetence. The concept of capriciousness
expects a result of chaos, while the concept of bias predicts a kind of
consistency and order, albeit one based upon inappropriate criteria.
In either situation, it appears that plaintiffs' lawyers are the ones tak-
ing advantage of the situation. In Mahoney's words, the system makes
it "too easy for a lawyer to persuade a jury ... to enrich plaintiffs and
contingent fee lawyers with multi-million dollar windfalls." 34
III. THE WORLD OF PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS
A. Knowable but not Predictable
At the outset, we said that the predictability/uncertainty dichotomy
may not make much sense to plaintiffs' lawyers. In either the world of
predictability or that of uncertainty, there would not be plaintiffs' law-
yers. Instead, plaintiffs' lawyers work in a world of contingency or the
likely-a world of knowable processes, actors, patterns, and regulari-
ties. The idea of predictability assumes a process that works some-
thing like a formula-if certain specific factors are present, then a
given result should always occur-and it assumes that it is clear what
those factors are. It is as if we were talking about some part of the
physical sciences. At the extreme, it is the kind of predictability-as
the earlier quote from insurance executive William McCormack
shows-that the insurance industry needs for underwriting risks and
determining appropriate prices for insurance.
Plaintiffs' lawyers simply do not look at the legal environment in
this way. They make sense of that environment in a completely differ-
ent way, because for them it does not lend itself to formula-like state-
ments. Still, their environment is knowable and understandable. To
explain this we think it would be helpful to borrow loosely from a
discussion by anthropologist Roy D'Andrade that looked critically at
different research worldviews among social scientists. It offers a met-
33. Id. at 1396 (footnote omitted).
34. Mahoney, supra note 31, at 21. Nearly the same words appear in the Science article. See
Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 24, at 1396.
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aphorical framework for thinking about the plaintiffs' lawyers' world
in contrast to the predictability critique.35 One key distinction
D'Andrade made appears relevant for this discussion: a distinction be-
tween a research approach corresponding to the physical sciences and
one corresponding to the natural sciences. Each, he says, has a differ-
ent answer to the question of what kind of knowledge social science
inquiry can produce and how it produces that knowledge.
The research world view of the physical sciences sees
an almost completely homogeneous universe where all generaliza-
tions apply equally through all time. There are only a few basic
objects and a few forces, and their interrelationship can be stated in
quantitative mathematical form. . .. There is also the sense that
everything is the way it is because of some deep necessity, which is
what one tries to capture in the statement of a law.36
This is the approach of "logical empiricism," which holds that "the
aim of science is to discover universal laws, and the method is to de-
duce causal hypotheses from more general theories and test them
against masses of observable data."37 The critics of juries and the
civil justice system who push the predictability critique seem to envi-
sion a legal system that should act in a way consistent with the physi-
cal sciences perspective. They appear to want the kind of
predictability and certainty that comes with interrelationships that can
be stated in law-like, mathematical form.
There is one big difference between the critics' approach and that of
the physical scientist. For the critics, predictability is the normative
standard to use in evaluating the civil justice system in general and
evaluating what juries do in particular. Because in their view the sys-
tem falls woefully short, changes should be made to ensure that it does
work in predictable fashion. In contrast, the physical scientist makes
no normative judgments and makes no arguments for changing what
he or she observes. The idea is to describe and explain rather than
pass judgment.
In contrast to a research worldview of the physical sciences,
D'Andrade points to a worldview corresponding to the natural sci-
ences. In this alternative, the world the natural scientist studies "is
very lumpy or patchy" and not amenable to predictive statements.38
35. See Roy D'Andrade, Three Scientific World Views and the Covering Law Model, in
METATIHEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCEI: PLURALISMS AND SUBJECfiVITIES 19 (Donald W. Fisk &
Richard A. Shweder eds., 1986).
36. Id. at 20-21.
37. PAUi DIESING, How DOFs SOCIAL SCIENCE WORK?: REFLIEfIlONS ON PRACIlCE, at x
(1991).
38. D'Andrade, supra note 35, at 21.
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Where the worldview of the physical science approach is based on re-
duction and uniformity, the natural science approach sees complexity
and contingency. From this perspective, D'Andrade notes, "The basic
questions are, What is it made of? How does it work? Generaliza-
tions about how things work are often complex, true only of one par-
ticular kind of thing, and are usually best stated in simplified natural
language."39 Such an approach is likely to mix together deductive and
inductive theorizing and to view different analytical techniques from
the pragmatic perspective of what will work in a given situation.
Rather than being about generalizable, predictive statements, this ap-
proach is about the nature of processes and their contingent relation-
ships with other factors. It is an orderly and knowable world, but not
a predictable one.
The plaintiffs' lawyers' worldview is closer to that of the natural
sciences; it is descriptive and analytical in character. Theirs is a bot-
tom-dweller's detailed view of the civil justice system rather than the
top-down, aggregate view of an outside observer or critic. It is a com-
plex, lumpy, and patchy world in which the lawyer needs to under-
stand how the process of resolving disputes actually works in a given
locale, who the key actors are, and how they behave (especially local
juries). It is a world very different from the one supposed in the pre-
dictability critique. This can be seen in the comments of a Fort Worth
lawyer in talking about local juries and the decision as to whether to
take a case:
The statistics around here are 7 out of 10 rear-end collisions are
losing [at trial] because of the propaganda factor [tort reform public
relations campaigns]. . . . So we take that perspective on every case
we take. The odds are against us no matter what. If we analyze the
odds, we figure they're going to be 60% to 70% against us on any-
thing. If we think they're 80%-90%, we're less likely to take that
case, because the odds are too much. It really depends on damages,
whether [the potential client] had prior problems. How clean is
their slate, because juries like it simple-[juries] don't like compli-
cated factors. And unfortunately, there's a lot of people that have
complicated lives-the jurors don't like that.
The comments of a San Antonio lawyer are similar but a bit less
pessimistic:
If you are case selective and you have good facts and good plaintiffs,
you can [win]. I mean just . . . there are no run-away juries . . . . I
think the jury, if they think you are being unreasonable, they are
going to punish you. And if they think you're being reasonable, and
if you are lucky and the other a guy is a gang-member scumbag,
39. Id.
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then they'll take care of your client. For the most part. Hey, we all
lose, not by choice but it happens.
B. Knowable but Risky
Most of what plaintiffs' lawyers do involves the handling of individ-
ual matters and individual clients. While the cases may be similar in
character, such as rear-end collision cases or medical malpractice
cases, they are never identical-if for no other reason than that they
involve different people. As the comments above suggest, the chal-
lenge is to learn the patterns and regularities of a process that does
not allow one to know for sure what will happen but at the same time
is not entirely random either. What makes that challenge especially
acute is the fact that one key player-the jury-is made up of a con-
stantly changing cast of individuals drawn from a varied pool of peo-
ple that still share at least some general characteristics or attitudes.
Because this world is knowable but not predictable, it is a risky one
in which to work. Adding to the riskiness, the plaintiffs' lawyers' busi-
ness model is based on the contingency fee. This means the lawyer
fronts the costs and gets paid and reimbursed only if he is successful,
and he may be well-rewarded when he is successful. If the lawyer is
not successful, he receives no fee for his time and probably no reim-
bursement for the costs incurred. As one lawyer said, "I front all the
costs and if we lose, I eat the costs."
Plaintiffs' lawyers have little choice but to use this model because
their clients could not otherwise afford their services. One lawyer we
interviewed nicely summarized the view of almost all plaintiffs' law-
yers regarding the contingency fee:
Ninety percent of the people out there make their living, they pay
for the kids to go to school, they pay to take care of their kids, they
pay for their mortgage, they pay for their one or two cars, and at the
end of the month, they may have $100 left over if they're the lucky
ones.... And so, for someone to have the ability to go hire a law-
yer on anything other than a contingency fee, you know, I think it's
a fiction.
Another said, "The simple truth is at least 95% of our clients could
not afford to pay the lawyer and could not finance the lawsuit. They
just couldn't-at least 95%."
In short, riskiness is at the heart of a practice based on the contin-
gency fee. Herbert Kritzer tells us that such a practice must balance
risks, costs, and potential rewards-more specifically, the risks of los-
ing, the costs that must be put into the case to have a chance at suc-
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cess, and the likely amount of the settlement or verdict. 40 In short, it
is about gauging the benefits and costs in order to manage that risk.
In managing risks, it is important to realize that a winning case may
not really equal success. To be successful, the case must yield an
amount sufficient to cover the client's needs, the lawyer's fee, and the
costs incurred. This is how one lawyer explained the problem:
Let's put it hypothetically. Let's say you've got $1000 worth of
damage to your car. You've got say $3000 worth of medical ... and
all of the sudden the insurance company says we'll give you $4500.
Well, you figure that out, nobody's going to come out all right [be-
cause it will not cover all the costs plus the usual contingency fee of
33%]. So you end up filing a lawsuit ... [and] you're going to spend
another $2000 or $3000 just proving your case .. . well then the next
thing you know you've got $3000 worth of medical and $3000 worth
of expense actually on the case. And if the jury comes back and
says, okay, we'll just give you your medical, you're screwed ... even
if you get $7500.
Because not all cases will be winners or sufficiently successful, Kritzer
also reminds us that a lawyer must balance risks, costs, and potential
rewards across a practice's entire array of cases.41 The plaintiffs' law-
yer has to hedge-there is simply not enough certainty.
C. Going Rates and Managing Risk
There is, however, enough regularity in the plaintiffs' lawyer's
world to enable the lawyer to build a practice. This world is neither
chaotic nor random-it is not the opposite of predictable. A plain-
tiffs' lawyer builds a practice around the "going rates." Going rates
depend on what particular kinds of cases are worth in a given locale,
and jury verdicts play a central role even though they tend to be rela-
tively infrequent. These going rates are well-known to the civil justice
system's regular players and have a powerful effect on how plaintiffs'
lawyers structure their practices and what they do. For example, a
Fort Worth-area lawyer said he has stopped taking certain kinds of
cases because of a change in the going rate:
With the way juries are now in Tarrant County, it's gotten to the
point if you have a rear-end collision with soft tissue injury, and say
less than $500, $1000 of property damages, you can't even afford to
take that case on. The insurance companies have gotten to where
they offer $500, $1000.
Similarly, a Houston lawyer said that "with respect to the state of
mind of juries in reference to minor cases . . . cases that used to be
40. See KRITZER, supra note 8, at 1-18.
41. See id. at 10-11.
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payable cases are no longer payable cases. Those are all gone . . . I
can no longer afford to handle them . .. that was almost a third of the
market . .. just little fender-benders." Perceptions of the going rate
can also lead lawyers toward certain kinds of cases. In light of the
hostility of juries toward personal injury suits (and as a result the
harder stance taken by insurance companies), another lawyer's small
litigation firm started handling commercial cases on a contingency fee
basis:
Those are easier cases than plaintiffs' personal injury cases. . . . We
do it on a contingency fee basis. They are easier because of standing
up and saying [to a jury] my client has suffered greatly, his knee will
never . . . and you have to try to paint the picture, you just write
some numbers on a blackboard and say this $4 million ... for some
reason people don't think those plaintiffs' are scumbags. They
don't think business plaintiffs are scumbags. They have no problem
with Southwestern Bell suing Greater Atlantic Bell. They don't like
Alexander Bell and his wife suing for an injury.
Other plaintiffs' lawyers are also moving in this direction because of
their perceptions of juries. An established Houston plaintiffs' lawyer
who is redirecting his practice said that "there are a lot of plaintiffs'
attorneys, personal injury type attorneys who have started doing com-
mercial work. And I see more competition in that area now as well."
Insurance executive McCormick is also aware of the importance of
juries. He noted, "Decided cases are only the tip of the iceberg; they
directly affect the thousands of other cases that get settled before go-
ing to court, not to mention acting as a stimulant for even more law-
suits."42 In other words, verdicts are important not just because of the
results for the parties involved in the suit, but also because of the
messages they send to others. Critics like McCormick are especially
worried about the messages they claim verdicts are sending to plain-
tiffs' lawyers and their clients, enticing them to file frivolous suits
against defendants with deep pockets in the hope of cashing in. This is
a sentiment reflected in the discussion above on predictability and un-
certainty and in the current statements of pro-reform groups like the
American Tort Reform Association and the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce's Institute for Legal Reform. 4 3 But it is the exact opposite of
what plaintiffs' lawyers actually do.
There is, of course, a much more sophisticated version of the idea of
juries as messengers in the law and society literature, and this version
42. McCormick, supra note 18, at 268.
43. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION supra note 4; INsTrTUTE FOR LEGAL RE.
FORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
2011] 349
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
places jury verdicts in a broader dispute-processing context.4 4 It is
worth discussing because it provides important insight into the world
in which plaintiffs' lawyers work-again, a world that is characterized
by neither predictability nor uncertainty. The idea of juries as mes-
sengers is usually associated with the work of Marc Galanter and what
he has called the "radiating effects of courts." 4 5
Galanter argues that even though jury verdicts resolve only a small
proportion of all civil disputes, they have a symbolic value and impact
that extends beyond their frequency. 46 Their importance lies in their
role as "transmitters of signals rather than as deciders of cases." 4 7
These signals, in turn, contribute
a background of norms and procedures, against which negotiations
and regulation in both private and governmental settings takes
place. This contribution includes, but is not exhausted by, commu-
nication to prospective litigants of what might transpire if one of
them sought a judicial resolution. Courts communicate not only the
rules that would govern adjudication of the dispute but also possible
remedies and estimates of the difficulty, certainty, and costs of se-
curing particular outcomes.48
Though ultimately small in number compared to the number of
cases filed and the number of events that may lead to a lawsuit (for
example, the number of automobile accidents), jury trials cast a large
shadow. 4 9  They send signals down through the entire process. In his
classic study of how insurance companies settle matters, H. Laurence
Ross found that, at least for serious bodily injury claims made to in-
surance companies, settlements seemed to be based on "an estimate
44. There is also parallel literature dealing with the criminal justice system.
45. See Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIEs Atiour
COURTS 117 (Keith 0. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983).
46. Id. at 119.
47. Marc Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury and the "Litigation Explosion,"
in Tin-- AMERICAN Civii JURY: FINAL REPORT OF TIE 1986 CIIIE JUSTICE EARL WARREN
CONFERENCE ON ADvocAcY IN THE UNITED STATES 15, 22 (1987).
48. Galanter, supra note 45, at 121.
49. For example, the Texas Department of Transportation reported the following for 2008: of
a total of 437,452 automobile accidents, 3,468 were killed in those accidents, 242,688 were in-
jured, of which 84,508 had serious injuries. See Rural and Urban Crashes and Injuries by Severity
2008, TEXAS DEPARTMENT oF TRANSPO RTATION, ftp://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/trf/crash
statistics/2008/2008_9.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). The Texas Office of Court Administration
reported the following for 2008 for district and county courts combined: 25,433 new auto tort
cases were filed and 650 auto tort cases were disposed of by a jury trial. See Trial Court Judicial
Data Management System, TEXAS OFFICE O CouRT ADMINISTRAIoN, http://www.dm.courts.
state.tx.us/oca/ReportSelection.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) ("Report Selection" function
used to obtain figures).
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of the likely recovery of the claimant before a jury."50 In his estima-
tion, "Formal decision-making procedures ... [are] quantitatively un-
important in the working out of legal rights and duties. To be sure,
formal decisions are qualitatively important, for they set standards
which informal decisions are expected to follow." 5'
This means plaintiffs' lawyers work, for the most part, in what schol-
ars have called the "shadow of the law."52 They are close observers of
the processes, actors, and rules that surround the handling of certain
kinds of disputes in a given locale. They build their practices around
knowable patterns and regularities that they see and learn. The com-
ments of a San Antonio lawyer reflect this very idea:
Jury verdicts at the courthouse are being changed. What this does,
of course, is have a trickle down effect. Because what we end up
settling cases for in pre-litigation or otherwise really depends on
what happens at the courthouse. If [insurance companies] are com-
ing and saying look at your local reporter, those types of cases got
poured out [lost before a jury] 80% of the time last term, why would
you think we would want to pay you any money?
This lawyer would then adjust his practice accordingly.
The meaning of the signals sent by formal decisions is dependent on
lawyers receiving and utilizing them. Plaintiffs' lawyers pay close at-
tention to what happens at the courthouse. One lawyer's view of local
trends in verdicts for auto accident cases gives some indication of how
he tracks things beyond looking at his own cases:
I think we've bottomed out on low jury verdicts. My reading of the
Blue Sheets [a local jury verdict reporter] indicates that juries are
paying more money on cases . . . and the people I talk to on the
defense side who try these kind of car wrecks day in and day out are
telling me the same thing.
Plaintiffs' lawyers do not have to make sense of these signals in iso-
lation. They are part of a larger community of plaintiffs' lawyers and
so there is a shared understanding of those processes, actors, and
rules.53 Lawyers talk with other lawyers about their experiences and
they belong to their own professional organizations that are a conduit
for information, including information about what juries are doing. In
50. H. LAURENCE Ross, SFTrTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 114 (1980).
51. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
52. Now widely used, the term appears to have entered the literature as a result of a 1979
article on divorce. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YA LE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
53. On the idea of practice communities among lawyers, see LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A.
McEwEN & RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DIVORCEI LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONAL-
ISM IN PRACTICE 41-63 (2001).
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Texas, this includes not only a strong and active state-level organiza-
tion that emphasizes networking and information sharing (the Texas
Trial Lawyers Association), 54 but also local organizations in the major
metropolitan areas.55 As one lawyer said, "I have heard lawyers talk-
ing about that, how there's-both from the TTLA LISTSERV and
locally-where you know, they're turning down cases where, in the
past, they would, you know, they might've taken a chance on." In
talking about his local trial lawyers association he went on to say, "in-
stead of all of us being all by ourselves in these offices, going against
these attorneys-defense attorneys and law firms-we're all con-
nected by our monthly meetings and also by email LISTSERV, where
you know, we're not on our own." 56
To a certain extent, learning the going rate process may be a part of
being socialized into the practice community much like learning the
going rate for plea bargaining may be a part of being socialized into a
local criminal justice system.57 But unlike plea bargaining, there are
readily available sources on the civil side that have tracked verdicts
for many years: jury verdict reporters.58 These are commercial, typi-
cally subscription services (a number are now online) that exist for
many parts of the country; some even claim to be national in scope.59
Such reporters are a powerful indicator of the role jury verdicts play
in forming the going rates as well as the importance of going rates
54. See TEXAs TRIAL LAWYERS AssocIATION, http://www.ttla.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
55. For instance, there is the Dallas Trial Lawyers Association and among the resources avail-
able to its members is information on verdicts and settlements. See Verdicts and Settlements,
DALLAS TRIAL LAWYERs AssoCIATION, http://www.dtla.net/DA/index.cfm?event=ShowApp
Page&pg=search&bid=138 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
56. On the role of listservs in building community among lawyers and disseminating commu-
nity norms, see generally Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace: The Impact of Legal Listservs
on the Professional Development and Ethical Decisionmaking of Lawyers, 37 ARIZ. STr. L.J. 589
(2005).
57. On learning about plea bargaining, see MILroN HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: TIHE Ex-
PERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, ANID DEFENSE ATFOrRNEYs 99-100 (1978). On the worth
of a criminal case, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROcEsS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASE7S IN A LOwER CRIMINAL COURT 158-67 (1979); Malcolm M. Feeley, Pleading Guilty in
Lower Courts, 13 LAw & Soc'Y Riv. 461, 462-63 (1979). On going rates, see JAMIS EISIN-
STEIN, Roy B. FLEMMING & PETER F. NARDULLI, TIE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES
AN) THIEIR COURTs 118-25 (1999).
58. See Stephen Daniels, Civil Juries, Jury Verdict Reporters, and the Going Rate (May
29-June 1, 1986) (unpublished paper presented at the 1986 Meeting of the Law & Society Asso-
ciation) (on file with authors).
59. For example, a widely used verdict reporter for the Houston area, the Blue Sheet, is now
available online via Westlaw. See Texas Blue Sheets Jury Verdicts Library on Westlaw,
WESTL.Aw, http://west.thomson.com/productdetail/14070/40015093/productdetail.aspx (last vis-
ited Mar. 9, 2011). Jury Verdict Review and Analysis claims to track verdicts nationwide (includ-
ing Texas) with information available online by subscription. See JURY VERDIcr REVIEW &
ANALYSIS, http://www.jvra.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
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themselves. These reporters' sole purpose (apparently a profitable
one) is to help communicate to the relevant actors-plaintiffs' law-
yers, defense lawyers, and insurance companies-the going rate in the
civil justice system. 60
Sixty-two percent of the respondents to our 2000 survey reported
that that they subscribed to a verdict reporter. Many of the plaintiffs'
lawyers we interviewed referred to local verdict reporters in a way
that shows verdict reporters are a key ingredient in gauging the going
rate. Said one, "I read the trial reports all the time." Another said, "I
look at these jury verdict reports and I see that a jury found the defen-
dant in a car wreck 100% negligent, the defendant ran a stop sign and
hurt somebody and they award . . . zero pain and suffering, zero
mental anguish, zero disability, zero physical impairment." Still an-
other said,
I was reading the other day [pointing to verdict reporters in his of-
fice] the plaintiff had sustained 3rd degree burns to his legs and had
to have surgery. The jury awarded, I think it was $5000 for physical
pain and suffering and mental anguish. That was just this month. If
they're not going to award much money for someone [who has] visi-
ble burns.
In talking about settlement discussions with insurance companies, a
Houston lawyer said, "They'll [insurance companies] throw a Blue
Sheet [local verdict reporter] with jury verdicts in front of you. And
my response is, 'Just show me my name where you've hammered me
and I'll take your money!"' An interesting comment by a staff lawyer
for a major television advertiser often castigated for never trying cases
showed the importance of verdict reporters in the plaintiffs' lawyers'
world and the messages they send to the relevant actors. In talking
about a recent decision by his boss to have the staff attorneys begin
trying cases, he noted that the reason "is the negative connotation that
sometimes [our] law firm carries with insurance companies because
we advertise . . . and I think sometimes that hurts us."
A key part of that negative connotation is the assumption-not nec-
essarily an incorrect one-that this firm would try few, if any, cases.
This put the firm at a disadvantage in negotiating settlements com-
pared to lawyers who have a reputation for trying cases. The staff
member went on to say that the firm's owner has "made a commit-
ment to litigation and trial cases." The intention behind the decision
to try cases is to send a message about the firm that hopefully will
enhance its bargaining position with regard to settlements. The owner
likes "seeing [the firm's] name in the Blue Sheet . . . the insurance
60. See Daniels, supra note 58, at 9-13.
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companies are seeing [us] trying cases. The other lawyers are seeing
[us] trying cases."
IV. WHY EVEN Do IT
A. The Pragmatic Balancing of Professionalism and Profit
Before looking at how plaintiffs' lawyers structure their practices to
manage the risks in their legal environments, there is a question that
must be addressed in light of the view found in the predictability cri-
tique. Answering it is important for understanding how plaintiffs'
lawyers view the environment in which they work (in contrast to the
view of the predictability critique) and how they structure their prac-
tices in light of that view. Given the risky nature of the plaintiffs'
lawyers' world and their reliance on the contingency fee as a business
model, one might wonder why any rational person would even choose
this line of work. In the predictability critique, the idea is that plain-
tiffs' lawyers are attracted to this line of work because they can profit,
often handsomely, from the civil justice system's dysfunctional and
chaotic character. To return to Richard Mahoney's words, the sys-
tem's lack of predictability makes it "too easy for a lawyer to persuade
a jury . . . to enrich plaintiffs and contingent fee lawyers with multi-
million dollar windfalls." 61 While there may be rhetorical value in
such a characterization, it does little to help us actually understand
these lawyers and what their practices can tell us about the civil justice
system in action.
Many plaintiffs' lawyers are motivated by important noneconomic
factors, such as the simple desire to be one's own boss (plaintiffs' law-
yers are predominantly solo or very small firm practitioners), the de-
sire to be an active litigator, or a sense of professionalism that is based
on an idea of representing the underdog. Of course, there are some
who see plaintiffs' practice simply as a moneymaker. In reality, the
motivation for pursuing a plaintiffs' practice is a mix of these reasons,
and profit always plays a role as it does with nearly all lawyers regard-
less of their practice area. We presume that this has always been the
case. As Robert Nelson and David Trubek noted in talking about
changes in the American legal profession,
When Paul Cravath developed his famous system for organizing
corporate law practice, he did so with a keen eye toward the market
for corporate legal services. Attacks on the commercialism of cur-
61. Mahoney, supra note 31, at 21. Nearly the same words appear in the Mahoney & Little-
john, supra note 24, at 1396.
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rent practices should not mislead us into thinking that the Cravath
firm was practicing law as a charity in the 1920s!62
Almost all lawyers work in a world in which professionalism and eco-
nomic interest necessarily coexist. The important question here is
what exactly is in the mix that helps us understand the plaintiffs' law-
yers' view of their world and why they would work in such a risky
environment.
To understand plaintiffs' lawyers' view of that risky environment
and why they work within it, we need some sense of how they see
themselves as professionals. For plaintiffs' lawyers, there is a distinc-
tive mix of professionalism and personal financial interest, and it can
be seen in the way Otto Mullinax, one of the most respected Texas
plaintiffs' lawyers of the mid-twentieth century, described the ethos of
his firm, the Mullinax Wells firm:63
That firm justified its existence by adhering to three simple objec-
tives: First, to earn a good living for its members and staff; Second,
to make that living representing unions and working people, if pos-
sible; and, Third, to use those resources, produced above the need
to serve the first two objectives, in advancing liberal political
processes in government and society. 64
Of course, one may disagree with Mullinax's particular idea of profes-
sionalism and public service (and the critics mentioned earlier most
certainly would), but there is no doubt that the practice of law was
about more than just making a good living.65 Most plaintiffs' lawyers
would agree with the sentiment animating Mullinax's objectives.
As in Mullinax's objectives, plaintiffs' lawyers' sense of profession-
alism is a pragmatic rather than an abstract one, as it must be in order
to balance against the need to make a good living. As a result, simply
asking lawyers to directly describe or articulate their sense of profes-
sionalism may not be the most productive avenue for understanding it.
A more useful approach may be to look at those values and that bal-
62. Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction: New Problems and New Paradigms in
Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAwYERs' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACrICEs: TRANSFORMATIONS
IN TIE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESsioN 1, 7 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L.
Solomon eds., 1992).
63. The firm name varied over time as partners joined or left the firm. Otto Mullinax and Nat
Wells were the constants. In addition to plaintiffs' work, the firm was also a major labor firm
representing unions.
64. Otto Mullinax, Address Introducing the Honorable Oscar Mauzy as the Newly Elected
Member of the Texas Supreme Court (Jan. 3, 1987) (on file with authors). Archived records of
the Mullinax Wells firm and an oral history interview with Mullinax can be found at the Univer-
sity of Texas at Arlington Library, Special Collections.
65. It is worth noting that the political views of our survey respondents lean in the direction of
Mullinax's views: 48% described their political views as liberal, 39% as moderate, and only 14%
as conservative.
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ance in relation to the severe criticisms of the one small group of
plaintiffs' lawyers that most other plaintiffs' lawyers love to hate: big-
time advertising lawyers, especially the television lawyers. What is
valued can be seen in what is found lacking in these advertisers. Tak-
ing this approach also reinforces the importance of jury verdicts and
the going rate for plaintiffs' lawyers' practices. Aside from being seen
as unprofessional, the advertisers are seen as having a negative effect
on juries and the going rate. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for
most other plaintiffs' lawyers to successfully balance risks and costs
against potential benefits.
B. Professionalism and a Worthy Cause
In explaining what is objectionable about the aggressive advertisers,
plaintiffs' lawyers often point to the goals of those they criticize in
contrast to a more appropriate set of professional goals. The criticized
lawyers are only interested in making money or building their prac-
tices-it's just a business. Such lawyers are not interested in their cli-
ents and the clients' best interests. Their practices are derisively
called "mills," and the lawyers themselves are referred to as "bottom
feeders" and even "scumbags." One highly respected plaintiffs' law-
yer was emphatic in his criticism of television advertising, which to
him seems unprofessional. What especially bothered him
are the people who are not competent to handle business, that ad-
vertise, get the business, and then instead of referring the better
cases, they handle those cases in a less than satisfactory way. They
make a fee on it, but their client is not very well served. The way
they make their money is on a volume practice. I view those people
as bottom feeders.
Another lawyer said that heavy advertisers "are not fulfilling a role as
an attorney, they're doing nothing but adjusting claims from the plain-
tiffs' standpoint." And still another lawyer argued, "They don't give a
damn. They got into to it for no worthy cause."
In one view, what is missing from these "bottom feeders" are the
kinds of noneconomic values that should be the motivating factors (al-
lowing, of course, for making a decent living). It is the "worthy cause"
that is missing-the "worthy cause" that helps to define for lawyers
what they are as professionals. An established East Texas lawyer de-
scribed himself as follows:
I'm a solo practitioner. I like the freedom of being solo. I've never
tried to handle a lot of mass torts. . . . I didn't want to take those
cases. I just wanted to help people on a one-on-one basis with car
wreck and workers' comp and, you know, premises liability. And I
enjoy doing that.
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Later in the interview he added, "It's part of my ministry, I guess. I'm
a Christian and I feel like this is part of my ministry to help people." 66
Another lawyer-a younger one in San Antonio-said, "I've always
had a feeling or empathy for the underdog. In most cases that I saw
[while working during law school in a lawyer's office] in the plaintiffs'
side of personal injury, you're the underdog . .. and going to take on
more powerful interests."
It is the sentiment underlying the second of the guiding principles
for Mullinax's firm. The younger lawyer in Houston noted,
Amongst plaintiffs' lawyers . . . you have two categories of lawyers.
You have true believers who are doing this because they really care,
they love people, they want to work for people, they want to help
people and that's why they got into this business in the first place. It
wasn't just driving fees and making money. . . . What has appealed
to me is a family with kids whose life gets turned upside down be-
cause someone in the family gets seriously hurt or killed and they're
facing a greater than David and Goliath battle and they need some-
one to fight for them. Guys like me, we can go do the commercial
litigation and make money. . . . If you are a true believer, then
what's the point of that? So you make money and you are not do-
ing something you believe in. You're not helping people.
He later talked about his recent hiring of a lawyer to work in his
office.
When I was interviewing him, he was telling me that his father
loaded and unloaded baggage at the Houston Airport for his entire
life and his father died when he was in high school. Before he died,
his father told him, "I want you to work with your brain, instead of
your back." And I asked him why he wanted to be a PI lawyer and
he said, "I want to help people who work with their back." I said:
you're hired. You're what I am looking for.
This is similar to the older lawyer in Austin who cannot see himself
having a different kind of practice: "I'd still rather be a lawyer doing
what I do for individuals than represent the bank or the insurance
company or Pa Bell."
The "bottom feeders," whatever they are, are not true plaintiffs'
lawyers in the eyes of their critics. A Dallas lawyer said,
The people who are really plaintiffs' personal injury trial lawyers
give back a phenomenal amount to the bar to trial lawyers' activities
... [while the "bottom feeders"] say well you big fat cats are trying
to keep us out and I'm going to advertise and get all these cases and
make just as much money as you do and never give anything back.
66. This lawyer is not alone in emphasizing his religious beliefs as part of his motivation for
pursuing his chosen career.
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Another lawyer neatly summarized the critical view: "You know,
those characters are obviously making money. If you speak to them
of the profession or the culture of the profession or the traditions,
they would look at you like you're from Mars. They're in it for a
buck."
In addition, the heavy advertisers and others who are openly ag-
gressive in getting clients are perceived as following a business model
that avoids actually trying cases. One Houston lawyer said, "Most of
those people ... have never seen the inside of a courtroom and don't
intend to ever see the inside of a courtroom, consider it a complete
waste of time." He later added, "They are not fulfilling a role as an
attorney, they're doing nothing but adjusting claims from the plain-
tiffs' standpoint." The idea is that a lawyer cannot be serving his cli-
ents well if he is not willing or able to litigate. This means that clients
are not likely to get the settlement they should because the insurance
companies will not pay since they know that the lawyer will not liti-
gate. In discussing some of the television advertisers, a Fort Worth
lawyer remarked that "the ones I knew .. . never tried any cases....
My impression of Y (a local advertiser) was that he used to settle for
whatever he could get. He told the client he had to take it."
Not all plaintiffs' lawyers will see themselves as "true believers" like
the younger lawyer in Houston previously quoted or feel that they
have a personal ministry like the lawyer in East Texas, but most share
the basic sentiment that animated the second of Otto Mullinax's three
objectives. This statement is a key reason why they work in the risky
world of plaintiffs' practice. Of course, there is a certain amount of
truth in the criticism of the aggressive advertisers-for some (but not
necessarily all), it is all about the money. One heavy advertiser with a
high volume business explained his view as follows:
Sometimes I think I really would like to get into the courthouse and
try a lot of cases, because I think I'd be pretty good at it. But then
again more important to me, to be perfectly frank with you, is to
make money. I don't mean to sound crass about it, but, you know,
heck if I've got an opportunity to be liquid for a few million dollars
by the time I'm 35 or so. . . . I'd rather do that then, you know,
become Perry Mason.
Another lawyer, a staff attorney for a heavy television advertiser, re-
sponded rather bluntly to another lawyer's criticism of his boss's ap-
proach: "I ain't a big proponent of these ads, but this is what [X]
wants to do. It's an economic thing-we're going to do it; it works; it
makes money for us."
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C. Professionalism, Pragmatism, and the Going Rate
There is more to the criticism of heavy advertisers by other plain-
tiffs' lawyers than just the sense of professionalism and mission. The
criticism reflects the pragmatic nature of plaintiffs' lawyers' sense of
professionalism and the importance of jury verdicts and going rates.
The substance and unprofessional nature of the aggressive tactics used
to get clients dovetails with the aggressive tort reform public relations
campaigns about frivolous lawsuits, runaway juries, greedy plaintiffs'
lawyers, the loss of jobs, and the prospect of no longer being able to
find a doctor. The most concrete indicator of this effect for plaintiffs'
lawyers is what they see when they go to the courthouse and choose a
jury. A Fort Worth lawyer's comments are typical of what many
others said:
I think advertising is bad. It greatly contributed to the public cyni-
cism towards lawyers and personal injury lawyers. I think it's been
a very major factor. Every time I go down to the courthouse for a
trial, I ask this because this is a question that will always get you a
response-have they seen the ads for lawyers advertising for cli-
ents? At a minimum, two-thirds have seen them, usually more than
that. Then if you say how many of you formed a bad impression
about personal injury lawyers or personal injury cases because of
those television ads, the vast majority of them raise their hand. The
case I tried in Dallas, there were eight jurors disqualified for cause
on that issue alone.
A Houston lawyer said,
I think advertising has been an engine that helped drive tort reform
for the business interests and for insurance corporations. Because I
think that so many attorneys, particularly the less experienced and
less capable, did an overwhelming amount of poor taste advertising
that just gave the appearance of the worst, put the worst possible
face on plaintiffs' litigation practice. When I'd see ads on the televi-
sion, late night ads, or something like that, it basically made . . . I
think it gave people the impression that we are all a bunch of used
car salesmen, and I hate that. Does that answer your question!
An East Texas lawyer said,
I would probably have to admit that I have a deep and abiding
prejudice against lawyer advertising.... I think that as much as any
other factor it is responsible for the image that the lawyer has in the
public eye today. I go over there [pointing out his window at the
courthouse] and I look at the jury panels. Folks out there ... every
time they turn their television on, radio on ... a lawyer telling about
how come hire him and he'll make the insurance company do
right. . . . They would say here's a guy who really doesn't give a
damn about a justifiable cause-he just wants money. . . . It has
generated a tremendous distaste in the attitude and in the eyes of
the public towards the legal profession . . . it has destroyed what the
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public thinks of this profession. That's my mild view about
advertising.
In short, the advertisers have helped "poison" the jury pools. A San
Antonio lawyer said, "There is so much solicitation going on, the pub-
lic is getting such a bad taste in their mouth for personal injury litiga-
tion in general-it's reflected in the jury verdicts." 67
Interestingly, the concern over aggressive solicitation has given rise
to a rival type of advertising aimed at reinforcing the plaintiffs' law-
yers' idea of professionalism and at blunting the negative impact on
the going rate. Established leaders in the plaintiffs' bar often do it.
This is advertising not so much about getting business as about public
relations. One lawyer described what his firm does as "an image-type
advertising." In explaining it he said, "For example, one of the ads
that we run is if you were going to see a doctor.. . you'd want to see a
board certified doctor and all the lawyers in our law firm are board
certified in personal injury trial law. That's basically it." One is a
thirty-second television spot. Another is an informational spot about
the jury system, and there is one about how "trial lawyers basically
defend principles of who's right and personal injury and fairness."
This lawyer readily admitted that "it's not a get business type of deal."
Its purpose is focused elsewhere. "We have gotten a lot of positive
comments from people talking about our ads. They like our ads and
they say, you know, we like yours and, boy, the other guy's ad, I can't
stand it." Rather than get business in the short-run, he said, "I think
it's helped our public image a lot, which is what we wanted to do."
This helps not only his public image, but hopefully the public image
of plaintiffs' lawyers as well. A key factor is the contrast with the
usual television lawyers and their ads as well as the contrast to the tort
reform public relations campaigns. It presents the public with a very
different image of a plaintiffs' lawyer-one much more professional
and serious and one not just hawking for business. One firm became a
local underwriter of the News Hour on PBS. A member of this firm
noted some original disagreement within the firm about the invest-
ment. He said,
They thought that you wouldn't get any business whatsoever for do-
ing that, and it's probably true . . . but that wasn't the reason for
doing it. The reason was to show that you had the public interest at
heart and it was a good will type thing-a true good will type thing.
Because we could say then, when we went over to select a jury, that
67. For evidence that lends credence to this view, see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The
Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225, 1237-50 (2004).
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we don't advertise except we do sponsor a program on public televi-
sion. There's more to it than just being a mercenary interest.
In short, while some lawyers practice in this risky world simply be-
cause they believe they can make money doing it, not all do. Every
plaintiffs' lawyer wants to make at least a decent living, but other
motivations are still at work for most. Juries and going rates are cen-
tral to successfully pursuing those motives because success depends on
being able to sufficiently balance the risks and costs against the poten-
tial benefits in a world of the probable but not certain.
V. How PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS STRUCTURE THEIR PRACTICES IN
A CONTINGENT WORLD
How plaintiffs' lawyers view this contingent world and manage the
risks involved in plaintiffs' practice is reflected in the way in which
they structure their practices. Most immediately, it means that they
structure them to be small and lean. As a general proposition, plain-
tiffs' lawyers' firms are very small, if for no other reason than to keep
down the amount of overhead they carry. In our surveys, 37% of the
respondents were solo practitioners and another 46% worked in firms
of 2-5 lawyers, meaning that over 80% of the lawyers worked in the
smallest of firms. By comparison, 60% of all private practice lawyers
in Texas work in solo practices or in firms of 2-5 lawyers.68 In addi-
tion, the non-lawyer staffs are also very small, constituting a median of
3 for our respondents.
There are, of course, larger plaintiffs' firms, especially those that
handle mass tort litigation or those that have a high-volume, low-value
business driven by television advertising. For instance, one television
advertiser employed 20 staff people and 2 other lawyers. Another had
80 staff and 4 lawyers. A firm that focuses on mass tort and had of-
fices in a number of states had about 60 lawyers (with the largest sin-
gle office having a dozen lawyers) with "probably . . . five or six
personnel for every lawyer," according to its head. These firms are
clearly an exception and they still pale in comparison in size to the
large corporate firms. For instance, Fulbright & Jaworski, which is
headquartered in Houston, has nearly 900 lawyers and a staff that
runs into the low thousands. There are nearly 300 lawyers in the
Houston office and departments in that office have far more lawyers
68. State Bar of Texas Membership: Attorney Statistical Profile (2008-09), STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=demographic-and-Economic
Trends&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=8792 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
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than the typical plaintiffs' firm. For instance, there are 23 lawyers in
the Houston office's intellectual property department alone.69
Plaintiffs' lawyers abhor unnecessary or excessive overhead because
they have to. It is the most important part of the costs that they must
balance against the risk and potential benefits they see in the going
rates. Any substantial amount of overhead requires a substantial and
steady cash flow month after month. For plaintiffs' lawyers working
on a contingency fee basis, this can be problematic. There is no guar-
antee that any particular matter a lawyer handles will be successful.
Even if it is successful enough, there is always the problem of how
quickly-or slowly-the proceeds will come in. A Houston lawyer,
who described his operation as "a small solo practitionership ... a low
volume, high quality personal injury practice with some modest over-
head," talked about delay in payments:
It's a common complaint; it's at the top of the bitch list for every
plaintiffs' lawyer. Fulbright [& Jaworskil representing Chevron just
write a letter saying here are our expenses. The insurance compa-
nies are slow [in paying judgments or settlements]. At least Ful-
bright-they may get a delay in the payment of their fees, but they
are not having to front [pay in advance with no guarantee of reim-
bursement] those experts or travel expenses. . . . [Insurance compa-
nies] wanted to put as much financial pressure on the plaintiffs' bar
as possible.
Basically, a plaintiffs' lawyer cannot bet on anything. Reminiscent of
Kritzer's observation that lawyers working on a contingency fee basis
must balance risks, costs, and potential rewards across a practice's
worth of cases,70 a San Antonio lawyer said, "You learn to have
enough irons in the fire to where you're not counting on any one.
Because you can't. You ever put yourself in that position, which some
guys do, then you're in real trouble."
The story of a lawyer who was forced to close a high-volume, low-
value practice illustrates the consequences of diminished cash flow.
Third-party insurance bad faith cases were an important part of his
business model (a victim bringing a claim against the defendant's in-
surance company for unfair settlement practices). When these actions
were eliminated, he faced an immediate problem: insurance compa-
nies "would just tender the policy limits . . . all of a sudden, that
69. See Intellectual Property and Technology: Lawyers, FuLBRIGIrf & JAWORSKI L.L.P., http://
www.fulbright.com/index.cfmfuseaction=attorneys.attorneys_1ist css&site-id=308 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2011).
70. See KRIrLzeR, supra note 8, at 11.
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$20,000 case, I'm getting $1500."71 He had less money coming in each
month, and he said,
I've got 19 people to pay here. I got health insurance; I got all the
stuff that comes along with having that many employees. And I'm
dying.... I had an overhead of $100,000 a month. If say one month
I get only $80,000, then I'm $20,000 in the hole next month. So now,
I gotta do $120,000 next month. And say next month I only do
$50,000. I'm really behind the eight ball.
Running a plaintiffs' practice is not a simple matter. As one Austin
lawyer said, "It's very difficult to run your business. Costs keep going
up . . . and the insurance companies get harder and harder." A law-
yer who was planning the future growth of his firm talked about the
need to move carefully:
One thing that being on this side [plaintiffs' side] and coming up
and opening your own office has taught me is to be very, very con-
servative when it comes to overhead. So, I get the cold sweats when
I have to hire somebody. I'm just very, very careful about incre-
mentally growing until it's really necessary to do that.
If the cases do not keep coming in or the proceeds from those that do
are too meager, cash flow drops accordingly and overhead has to be
reduced. One lawyer who has seen the proceeds from his cases de-
cline had reduced his staff and looked at other ways to cut overhead:
It's just a matter of economics, I mean the personal injury field is
not as lucrative as it used to be.... So we're trying to work with less
personnel ... and the other part is automation. We've done a lot of
automation . . . trying to work smarter instead of harder with less
personnel.
To deal with the cash flow problem, some lawyers will focus a part
of their practice on certain low-risk matters with the hope that these
matters will cover the overhead. For instance, one lawyer said, "Auto
[automobile accident cases] basically covers overhead and the bigger
cases . . . the products cases, the serious, you know real serious like
death cases, that's where the money I guess comes in . . . auto ...
keeps the ball rolling, keeps the salaries paid and that sort of thing."
Another lawyer looked to simple non-contingency fee cases. A per-
sonal injury case, he said, "may settle tomorrow, it may settle next
year." As a result, cash flow is a problem. His approach is to "main-
tain the office with cash flow from wills, divorces, bankruptcy, and
then continue with the PI as much as we can. My goal is to take as
many PI cases as I can possibly get."
71. See Md. Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. 1996).
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Smaller firms also mean relatively small caseloads. The median for
our respondents was 35 open cases. For most plaintiffs' lawyers, the
typical case value is modest-$40,000 in 2006 dollars. A higher num-
ber of cases means more personnel to handle the volume-more over-
head. Higher volume also means additional spending to keep that
higher volume of cases coming into the firm, and this usually means
advertising. Rather than go for more volume as a way to ensure a
significant cash flow, plaintiffs' lawyers specialize. Being a plaintiffs'
lawyer is itself a specialization, but we find plaintiffs' lawyers tend to
specialize even more within this practice area. It is one way to mini-
mize risk in a contingent world. If a lawyer deals with a narrow range
of similar cases,.he can develop expertise. This, in turn, makes it eas-
ier to master the going rates.72
Most of our survey respondents specialized more narrowly than just
in plaintiffs' cases taken on a contingency fee basis. Defining a spe-
cialist as a respondent reporting 50% or more of his or her caseload in
one particular type of case, we identified 16 types of specialists. Only
4 of those types included 25 or more respondents and they correspond
to the cases making up the 4 largest categories of cases handled, on
average, by our respondents: auto accident (344 specialists), medical
malpractice (83), commercial (59), and products liability (50).73 All
told, just under two-thirds (64%) of all respondents were specialists of
some kind, with just over one half of all specialists (344 of 638) being
auto accident specialists.
VI. How PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS GET AND SCREEN CASES
A. Getting Cases
The greatest challenge plaintiffs' lawyers face is attracting sufficient
profit-producing matters to stay in business. They represent one-shot
clients, not repeat players. So they must generate an ongoing flow of
such clients in order to survive financially. Because they rely on the
contingency fee, plaintiffs' lawyers cannot simply take anything that
comes in the door with the idea of playing the legal lottery and getting
a windfall from a dysfunctional and chaotic system. As Kritzer notes,
there are two sides to the challenge. A lawyer needs "to attract a
stream of potential clients while at the same time declining to re-
72. Of course, this introduces a new risk as well-the risk that something changes in that area
of specialization and cash flow diminishes as a result. The example above of the lawyer who
relied heavily on third party bad faith insurance cases is a telling example.
73. The other twelve types follow in order of frequency: criminal (23), domestic relations (23),
employment (23), consumer fraud (9), workers' compensation (7), civil rights (7), nursing home
(6), aviation (5), premises liability (5), railroad injuries (5), probate (4), and bankruptcy (1).
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present a large proportion of those clients. A lawyer must constantly
look beyond the risks and rewards of a single potential case to the
implications of a case for the lawyer's continuing portfolio of cases." 7 4
In other words, the challenge lies in attracting a sufficient number of
potential clients and then in screening them to find the best opportu-
nities in light of the going rates.
Cost, again, is a major factor, and so despite the apparent ubiquity
of lawyer advertising, it accounted for just 14% of the survey respon-
dents' business on average. Bringing in a substantial number of cases
requires an intense and constant advertising effort-especially televi-
sion, which is simply too expensive for most lawyers. 75 The most pro-
lific advertisers will spend well over $1 million a year just for the
airtime.76 Less expensive, other forms of advertising-like the Yellow
Pages-still mean a substantial addition to a practice's overhead in a
contingent world. For example, one Yellow Pages user said, "The Yel-
low Pages, of course, cost us a fortune . . . it just makes me sick to
write those checks. It's $20,000-$25,000 we're spending on it." This
was a monthly expense because this lawyer was advertising in five dif-
ferent telephone books in his metropolitan area.77
For a lawyer who advertises to any degree, there is another set of
costs involved. These are the costs of the personnel and infrastruc-
ture-meaning even more overhead-needed to handle the calls com-
ing into the practice, screen those calls (very few lawyers take
everything or even most of what comes in), and service those matters
the lawyer does take. Lawyers need the extra resources to handle a
larger number of calls and clients and additional space and equipment;
and then they also need to maintain a larger number of calls and cli-
ents to pay for the additional resources and facilities. In addition, law-
yers also complained about the quality of the calls, which required
substantial attention to screening (and added cost). And finally, a
lawyer has to weigh the possible disapproval of his peers if the adver-
74. KRrZER, supra note 8, at 46.
75. For all respondents, television accounted for only 3% of business, and it accounted for
50% or more of business for fewer than 2% of respondents.
76. In a 1999 article, we reported on the television spending for Jim Adler of Houston-the
most prolific advertiser in the late 1990s. We noted that he "spent almost $1.4 million in the
Dallas/Fort Worth television market for the period July 1998 through June 1999, and $3.3 million
in the Houston market for the period January 1997 through June 1999," and these were not the
only markets in which he advertised. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "It's Darwinism-Sur-
vival of the Fittest:" How Markets and Reputations Shape the Way in Which Plaintiffs' Lawyers
Obtain Clients, 21 LAw & Pot'Y 377, 390 (1999).
77. For all respondents in the pooled database, the Yellow Pages accounted for 8% of
business.
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tising is seen as too aggressive or unprofessional along with the poten-
tial negative effects on the jury pool and the going rates.
Rather than advertising, most business for plaintiffs' lawyers comes
from referrals of one kind or another-76% of the respondents' busi-
ness. More specifically, 38% of business came from referrals from
other lawyers, 27% came from referrals from former clients, and 12%
came from other referrals. Which source is more important for a law-
yer depends on the nature of his practice. For instance, lawyers who
specialize in automobile accident cases tend to rely more on client
referrals than lawyer referrals-34% versus 26% (all advertising ac-
counted for 20% of business). One Houston solo practitioner is such
a lawyer: "Referrals from old business, just old clients, probably re-
present about 80% of my clients." This reflects the traditional idea of
lawyers as professionals who attract clients because of their ability,
integrity, and reputation for serving clients' needs. Lawyers like this
one can rely heavily on word-of-mouth client referrals because their
practices are localized. Geographically, most of these lawyers' clients
come from the county in which they are located or an adjacent county.
A localized practice makes it easier for a lawyer to master the going
rates.
As Kritzer found in Wisconsin,78 reputation is at the heart of client
referrals for plaintiffs' lawyers in Texas. A practice is built as a law-
yer's reputation grows as a result of satisfied clients recommending
the lawyer. For a plaintiffs' lawyer, this means that they must accept
only clients with cases that can be handled successfully. A solo practi-
tioner in San Antonio noted, "You get some direct business-you rep-
resented somebody, did them a good job and their brother or sister,
friend at church has an accident and they say: my lawyer did a good
job, call him." In light of the going rates, if a lawyer cannot choose
enough cases that will be successful, he is unlikely to get many client
referrals in the future.
Lawyers relying heavily on client referrals for cases must also culti-
vate that client base. Reputations can fade quickly if they are left
unattended. Lawyers cultivate their client base in a variety of ways.
We found that it is not at all unusual for plaintiffs' lawyers-especially
those with localized practices focusing on "bread and butter cases"-
to informally help a caller or a former client with a small matter with-
out charge. They do so because they believe it generates good will
and possible referrals in the future. Said one lawyer in San Antonio
78. See KRIZER, supra note 8, at 230-34.
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whose practice concentrates on a working class clientele that is about
50% Hispanic and 50% Anglo,
We do a lot of pro bono work for our existing clients or our past
clients. Let's say they have a little matter ... a little fender-bender
with no injuries and the other party won't talk to them. They'll
come see us, we'll write letters here and there. We took a case to
trial last year that was a matter of principle-people that only had
property damage and we felt they were being very, very mistreated
by the insurance company. We took it on knowing that it was going
to be free and at a loss. But we were able to get them some money.
They left very pleased. In turn, they will send us more business.
In addition, service to the client is very important. Many lawyers
realize that theirs is a service business, and treating the customer right
helps build a reputation. As one lawyer said, "Service to your client is
real important." Some lawyers have case tracking systems that re-
mind the lawyer or a staff member to call each client once every two
weeks or once a month. Another said that service also means fair
treatment and ensuring that the client gets good results, meaning
above all that the client does not come out on the short end of a ver-
dict or settlement.79 A client who feels short-changed will not refer
future clients. Several lawyers said that if need be they would reduce
their fee or talk with a health care provider about taking less money.
The lawyer quoted above who called service "real important" said,
"We will reduce our attorney fees to help a client. . . . We can put
more money in the client's pocket." Similarly, a lawyer in Austin
said,so
We, to be honest with you, there are very few times we actually take
a 40% fee [on a case that goes into litigation], but there are times
when we deserve and we take it. But it does give us leeway and at
times we take 20%. The case hasn't panned out the way we wanted
and in order to get the case settled we give in our fee. So it happens
that way and not by any means do we take a 40% fee on every case
we settle. It's actually pretty rare.
We are not suggesting that all plaintiffs' lawyers are this concerned
with their reputation or service. But those who rely upon client refer-
rals and are successful in maintaining a client base tend to be con-
cerned about reputation and service. In fact, it is a matter of some
79. Herbert Kritzer and Jayanth Krishnan found that referrals by former clients are extremely
important to lawyers in Wisconsin. See Herbert M. Kritzer & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyers
Seeking Clients, Clients Seeking Lawyers: Sources of Contingency Fee Cases and Their Implica-
tions for Case Handling, 21 LAw & PoL'Y 347, 360-61 (1999).
80. Typically, 40% is the fee for a case that goes into litigation, with 33% typically being the
fee for a case settling beforehand.
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professional pride for lawyers to say that most of their business comes
from word-of-mouth referrals from former clients.
Lawyers handling higher stakes and more complex cases see lawyer
referrals as more important than client referrals. For instance, medi-
cal malpractice specialists (respondents who had 50% or more of their
business in medical malpractice) reported that 58% of their business
came from lawyer referrals. For some, the percentage may be much
higher. A Houston medical malpractice specialist said, "Probably
90% of our cases are from other lawyers." Lawyers like these special-
ists rely heavily upon lawyer referrals because consumers are unlikely
to know who the specialists are,'although other lawyers are likely to
know.81
The key to lawyer referrals, as with client referrals, is the reputation
of the lawyer receiving the referral. Here it is the lawyer's reputation
in the legal community. What makes a lawyer an attractive referral
partner is that lawyer's reputation for success and his resources. As
one lawyer put it,
That's 95% of the game, just getting the cases . . . in order to get
that case, what's going to happen is some lawyer is going to bring it
to you. And the reason he brings it to you is because, at least in his
mind, you have a reputation for being equipped to deal with it, and
equipped to get a good result, which is important to him because
he's going to get a referral fee. . . . The legal community has to see
the firm in such a way that they believe the firm will get a good
result and can finance the case.
This puts a premium on that lawyer's mastery of the issues involved in
the case and mastery of a unique set of going rates. Of course, it also
means taking good cases.
B. Screening Cases
Given the world in which plaintiffs' lawyers work, cases must be
screened with some care if these lawyers are to stay in business, and
the going rate is at the center of this process. A practice that uncriti-
cally takes all comers-a practice made up of a large proportion of
problematic or frivolous cases-is one that will certainly be short-
lived. The same is true of the lawyer who takes cases with the hope of
81. This is reflected in the use of direct mail to other lawyers. Medical malpractice specialists
in our pooled survey data set were more likely to use direct mail to other lawyers than automo-
bile specialists. Of 83 medical malpractice specialists, 25.3% used direct mail to other lawyers,
while only 9.9% of 344 automobile accident specialists did. At the extreme, a Dallas medical
malpractice specialist sent his marketing brochure to every lawyer in private practice in Texas.
More modestly, a Houston medical malpractice specialist sent his brochure to every lawyer prac-
ticing in areas from Houston to San Antonio and south to the border.
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hitting a jackpot.8 2 The lawyer must be able to identify those cases
with adequate liability and a reasonable chance of obtaining a level of
compensation sufficient for the client while still covering the lawyer's
fee and expenses. "You can't have every case be a good one. You
hope and strive for that so hard. ... I'd like to have each one of them
have decent value, having screened each one very carefully," is how a
Houston lawyer put it. He went on to say, "I made lots of money on
premises liability [cases] in the past because I carefully screened them.
They were good cases with the facts . . . liability and damages."
The exact process used to screen cases varies, but the basic parame-
ters do not.8 3 As one lawyer with a practice focused on automobile
accident cases explained,
I don't look just at the damages. I was taught a long time ago that
in order to have a good personal injury case, you need three things:
1) you need good liability; 2) you need good damages; and 3) you
need a solvent defendant. It doesn't do any good to just have two of
the three. So I try and evaluate all 3 of those factors in deciding
whether or not to take the case.
Similarly, a lawyer who specializes in medical malpractice said, "If
there's not good liability, you shouldn't take the case." But it is im-
portant to note that good liability is not enough in light of the going
rates. There still must be a reasonable chance of getting enough
money to cover both the client's needs and the lawyer's needs. Law-
yers regularly turn down cases with good liability and low or no
damages.
Plaintiffs' lawyers typically take only a small percentage of the calls
they get from potential clients. Overall, our respondents signed up,
on average, 25% of the callers.8 4 The percentage was slightly higher
for lawyers who specialize in automobile accident cases-34%; and
the percentage was much lower for lawyers specializing in medical
malpractice cases-10%. For the medical malpractice specialists, no
lawyer participating in our surveys accepted more than 50% of the
cases and 80% accepted less than 15% of the cases. For the automo-
bile accident specialists, 20% of them signed up 50% or more of the
callers. The difference, of course, reflects the vastly different risks and
82. On the jackpot theory of plaintiffs' practice, see Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 24, at
1396.
83. On the need to examine the screening process and not just the rate of case acceptance, see
Mary Nell Trautner, How Social Hierarchies Within the Personal Injury Bar Affect Case Screen-
ing Decisions, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 215, 240 (2006).
84. Kritzer found an acceptance rate of 31% for the contingency fee lawyers he studied in
Wisconsin. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice
System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 24 (1997).
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costs of the two types of cases. All plaintiffs' lawyers would probably
agree with the lawyer we quoted at the very beginning of this Article
who said,
I have to be able-on a contingency fee-to be able to see the light
at the end of the tunnel. It doesn't mean that I'm 100% sure I'm
going to recover, because it is never guaranteed. But I usually have
a pretty good idea when I take a case that there is going to be some
sort of recovery.
In deciding whether to take a case, what local juries have been do-
ing is always an important part of the equation. In a Houston lawyer's
view, "Right now, [insurance companies] are real tight with money
because juries are real tight ... ." Lawyers are not going to take cases
that juries reject or for which juries award too little money. For exam-
ple, the working perception among most plaintiffs' lawyers is that ju-
ries look on soft tissue injury cases negatively and so lawyers shy away
from them.85 For the automobile accident cases they do take, lawyers
are screening more stringently. 86 One lawyer said, "Well, we're selec-
tive. Low impact, soft tissue cases, we're very selective because the
insurance companies are not paying for those cases, as well as juries
are not giving monies for those cases." Even high-volume television
advertisers pay attention to screening. "We try to screen them pretty
good," one said. The first level is on the telephone at the initial call:
"We do a screening on the phone, where we go through the facts with
them." If it looks like there may be something, the lawyer talks to the
caller in person and "we usually sign them up with the proviso that
we're going to tell them in 2-3 weeks, after we've investigated it,
whether it's a case or not." In describing what is involved he said,
"With three investigators, we try to get out there, get the pictures, get
witness statements, discover the case immediately." Once some inves-
tigation has been done, "then we'll make a decision here in the office,
looking at what evidence we've been able to collect, if this is a decent
case or not. Most of the time, unfortunately, they're not." As this
lawyer's story makes clear, lawyers devote a substantial amount of re-
sources to screening.
The riskier and more complex the case, the greater is the invest-
ment required for screening. A lawyer who occasionally handled both
medical malpractice and products liability cases that were not too
large or complex described his approach to screening:
[For medical malpractice] we have a nurse and several doctors that
we have available to us on a contract basis.. .. They screen every
85. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 67 at 1256-57.
86. See id. at 1257-61.
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case that comes into the office. Especially in the medical negligence
cases, we go through two or three different screenings to make sure
that they are the type of case that will be cost effective and in the
end will yield a positive result. On the products cases, we have a
better feel but even there we've got to be very careful. We have to
have a very serious injury for both cases, but for products cases
that's one of the very first requirements. For example, I don't take
... let's say an aerosol can that is defective and explodes and blows
away somebody's finger. That's not worth taking unless it's a little
girl or small child. But if it's an adult, it's just not cost effective....
You have to realize that in today's climate every case that you take,
there's a 95% chance it will have to be tried to a jury. Our philoso-
phy is we never take a case for settlement purposes because that's a
good way to lose a lot of money, lose your time and to have a very
unhappy client at the end.
A lawyer who focuses almost exclusively on medical malpractice will
have an even more elaborate process. If a potential case gets past the
initial screening by a nurse-paralegal, and most do not, the
nurse-paralegal
either on her own or after consultation with one of the doctor-law-
yers gets a medical authorization from the potential client and gets
the medical records to review. We almost never take a contract
from a client without first obtaining and reviewing all the medical
records in the case. . . . So medical records are obtained and then
the normal process is that those records are going to be reviewed by
one of the nurse-paralegals and by one of the MD-JDs, and then
either the records themselves or those initial reviews are going to be
reviewed by the senior MD-JD and it's going to be reviewed by me.
And then we meet once a month, what we call our non-litigation
meeting. In any given month we're going to have 70 or 80 cases
under consideration for the ones we're going to take. We talk about
all of them. There has to be agreement for the medical side and
from my side, the legal side of it, that we're going to pursue that
case-that not only is the medicine favorable in terms of we believe
that there has been a medical screw-up and that we can find an ex-
pert that will say that, or we've already found an expert that will say
that. At that point we will have done research through Medline and
the medical journals and the medical texts, and we will have medical
research that says what was wrong. And then I look at it from a
damages standpoint, a venue standpoint, and an economic stand-
point. Only if we agree on all that and basically I and [the senior
MD-JD] reach agreement, kind of everybody in the room reaches
agreement, do we then decide we're going to then get the client and
sign the client up.
Lawyers handling other kinds of complex, high stakes cases take a
similarly thorough approach.
Some lawyers set a floor for the potential value of the case, al-
though it may not always be high. Obviously, for medical malpractice
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specialists, it will be well into six figures or more. For a younger law-
yer with a small operation who focuses primarily on automobile acci-
dent cases, it can be relatively low. For a younger Austin lawyer, he
and his partner will not accept a case
unless we think it will generate a fee to the firm of at least $1,000,
and that's after the smoke all clears, the referring lawyer is paid,
and full expense reimbursement. That small fee case is a routine
case in which 95% of the work can be done by non-lawyer staff.
Screening also takes the client into consideration. In looking at
what juries and insurance companies do, this is crucial. It is not a
matter of choosing clients that the lawyer thinks will evoke sympathy
from the jury; instead, it is a matter of not taking a client that a jury
will view negatively. According to a San Antonio lawyer,
Just across the board the credibility of your client is ever, ever more
important in these times. You have to have a client that has a good
work history, a client that has never been in trouble with the law.
Those things make for a cost effective case. That's not to say that
someone that's been in jail or has been convicted of a felony doesn't
deserve to be handled by my office, but going in we know-and
those are very standard questions for us-going in we know that
that person is going to have to give some ground or that case will
never be resolved. Or if it is tried it's going to be lost or severely,
severely compromised.. .. So those are the cost effective things that
we look at.
The explanation by a Houston lawyer of how he screens clients is
quite similar:
We look for a client with no prior problems. It makes a good im-
pression . . . those are the types of cases we've gone there, tried, got
verdicts. Because we found that people [jurors]-that as long as you
don't have somebody up there that has a lot of prior claims, and
makes a good impression, is a working person-they'll award them
some money. . .. What [jurors] don't want to see is Joe Blow who
has a soft tissue back injury, but also had a soft tissue back injury
two years ago, and fours years ago, and doesn't work and is unem-
ployed, has three kids and is on welfare. And those are lot of cases
that get tried [and lose].
His view of what juries find acceptable is his guide, and it illustrates
the long shadow cast by juries. It also illustrates quite well the way
risk is managed in a contingent environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
While much of the long-standing debate over predictability and un-
certainty in the law has focused on the law on the books, our focus has
been on plaintiffs' lawyers and what their practices can tell us about
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the law in action. Plaintiffs' lawyers work in a world of contingency
rather than a world of predictability or a world of uncertainty. For the
most part they work in the shadow of the law, and they are close ob-
servers of the processes, actors, and rules that surround the handling
of certain kinds of disputes in a given locale. They build their prac-
tices around knowable patterns and regularities that they see and
learn. More specifically, they build their practices around going rates,
which are tied to juries and jury verdicts. Nonetheless, it is a risky
world made even more so by a reliance on the contingency fee, which
means that the lawyer fronts the costs and gets paid and reimbursed
only if he is successful. Many enter this practice area with a particular
sense of professionalism in combination with the desire to make a
good living. Success depends on their ability to structure and operate
their practices around the going rates in a way that balances cost and
risk against potential benefit. In other words, their practices show
that the civil justice system is knowable and orderly.
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